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Introduction1 
This article explores the forms of cosmopolitanism that are an important element of the identities 
and activities of long-distance Muslim merchants involved in the global trade in Chinese 
commodities. It focuses on two nodes located at different extremes of Asia that are central for this 
type of trade and that also feature prominently in the geographical imaginations of Muslim Asia’s 
traders: the port of Odessa on Ukraine’s Black Sea coast, and the officially designated ‘International 
Trade City’ of Yiwu in China’s Zhejiang Province. Both Odessa and Yiwu have risen to prominence in 
the geographical horizons of Asian Muslim traders over the past two decades as vibrant sites for the 
procurement and distribution of small and mostly low-grade Chinese-made commodities. Odessa is 
well-known to scholars of the post-Soviet world for the Seventh-Kilometre wholesale market: a 
‘container market’ that acts as a central distribution node for Chinese commodities across Ukraine 
and, until the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, also Russia (cf. Humphrey and Skrvskaja 2009). 
While the commodities sold in the Seventh-Kilometre are sourced by traders from a variety of cities 
in China, including Beijing and Guangzhou, Yiwu is an especially significant location for Odessa-based 
traders to source ‘small commodities’ (especially toys, umbrellas, and souvenirs). If the Seventh-
Kilometre market figures strongly in representations of contemporary Odessa, then Yiwu’s 
commercial landscape is dominated by the world’s largest market for the purchase of ‘small 
commodities’: the Futian market complex is home to over 70,000 shops which sell 1.7 million types 
of ‘small commodity’ (Marsden 2016a).  
An expanding body of scholarship has documented and theorised the type of insights that a 
consideration of the social and economic dynamics of markets such as the Seventh-Kilometre and 
Futian reveal into the nature of ‘globalisation from below’ (Matthews et al. 2012). Less is known 
about the relations that exist between the different nodes that are critical for this type of commerce 
(Pliez 2012). An analysis of such city-to-city relationships adds a further layer to our understanding of 
‘globalisation from below’, however, because the connections between Yiwu and Odessa are 
mediated not only through a flow of commodities but also a sustained circulation of commercial 
personnel.2 As I explore below, the identities of the mobile merchants and sojourners involved in 
such types of movement are regularly informed by the long-term experience of mobility, often over 
the course of several decades. In terms of the relationship between Odessa and Yiwu, Muslim 
communities and networks play an especially visible role in mediating the relationship between 
these two trading cities: investigating the relationship between the two cities also stands to 
illuminate the understanding of the forms of Islam and Muslim identity that are an important 
feature of China’s relationship to the post-Soviet world.  
The article builds on and make connections between two bodies of literature that raise conceptual 
issues for both anthropologists and historians concerned with study of trade, mobility, and 
transregional connectivity. On the one hand, studies of transregional trading networks have revealed 
the insights that this type of social formation offers into understanding the nexus between mobility 
and cosmopolitan identity formations. Scholars of trading networks have brought recognition to the 
long-term role that ‘mobile societies’ have played in forging connections between adjacent world 
regions, and over long periods of time (Ho forthcoming). In so doing, they have illuminated the 
                                                          
1 Following anthropological convention, pseudonyms are used throughout.  
 
2 On the notion of circulation see Markovits et. al 2006; cf. Ho forthcoming on ‘mobile societies’.  
3 
 
importance of the transregional as a specific scale of analysis (Henig 2016b) and brought into focus 
analytical problems associated with the use of categories such as ‘globalisation’ and 
‘translationalism’ (Ho 2002). This body of literature has also made a contribution by demonstrating 
that trading networks play a role in facilitating not merely the geographical movement of 
commodities but also of ideas and practices.  Historians increasingly recognise how rather than 
having been based merely on ‘in-group cohesion’ (Thompson 2011), the permeable social identities 
of those who made up trading networks facilitated the type of cross-cultural relations that were 
critical to their commercial activities (Aslanian 2011; Trivellato 2014). Anthropologists have built on 
this literature by addressing the ways in which cross-cultural interactions reflect sedimeted forms of 
social action embedded in historic mobility, rather than arising directly out of the ‘flows’ associated 
with modern expressions of globalisation (cf. Marsden and Ibanez 2015). 
Recognition of the flexible nature of the social identities of trading networks led several 
anthropologists to conceptualise such social formations as being ‘cosmopolitan’ (e.g. Werbner 
1999). More recently, scholarship has addressed the way in which by focusing on the cosmopolitan 
openness of trading networks earlier studies paid insufficient attention to the intensely ‘local’ aspect 
of mobile traders’ identities and the ways in which in which these existed alongside their 
cosmopolitanism (Ho 2006; Marsden 2008; Osella and Osella 2007). A second body of work that 
developed in parallel to studies nuancing the use in anthropological theory of the notion of 
cosmopolitanism, documented the contested political history of the term, shedding light on the 
celebratory way in which academics have deployed it (Cf. Grant 2011; Gilroy 2009; Humphrey 2004, 
2012). In the light of new studies of ‘local cosmopolitans’ and critical awareness of the term’s 
politically charged history, scholars have increasingly studied ‘post-cosmopolitanism’. Post-
cosmopolitanism is used in the analysis of contexts whose populations have experienced ‘a co-
presence of cosmopolitanism and its opposite, ethnic violence, …. over time’ (Humphrey and 
Skvirskaja 2012:6; cf. Henig 2016a). Studies of post-cosmopolitanism focus not on unqualified 
attempts to achieve universal human openness but on the specific practices people living in fragile 
social settings employ in order to live a life that is simultaneously both ‘together and apart’ 
(Humphrey and Skvirskaja 2012: 6).   
In this article, I seek to bring anthropological literature on cosmopolitanism into conversation with 
scholarship that has sought to document and theorise ‘Islamic cosmopolitanism’ (Bose and Manjapra 
2012; MacClean and Nasir 2010; Werbner 2016). Islamic cosmopolitanism is depicted as emerging 
over the course of centuries of Islamic history and in the context of mobility and interaction resulting 
both from Islamic teachings and practices (especially those collectively labelled as Sufi) and the 
importance of long-distance trade to Asia’s Muslim societies (e.g. Nasir 2016: 146-149; Lawrence 
2012). There is recognition of the conceptual problems inherent with such scholarship. Hodgson 
(2009 [1973]) distinguished, for example, between the use of the term ‘Islamic’ to refer to a religious 
tradition, and ’Islamicate’ to a culture that had emerged in the context of an expansive ‘Afro-
Eurasian’ Muslim dominion. Ahmed (2016) suggests however that this distinction reproduces a 
simplistic understanding of Islam as a law-centred ‘religion’: this does little justice to Islam’s cultural 
capaciousness, leading Nasir to argue the case for recognising the historic significance of a 
distinctively Islamic cosmopolitanism in a world arena he refers to as the Balkans-to-Bengal complex. 
Nile Green (2016), furthermore, has recently added a new angle to theoretical debates on the nature 
and place of cosmopolitanism in the history of Muslim Asia. He argues that a consideration of the 
current dynamics of Muslim Asia throw into sharp relief the celebratory tone of scholarly work on 
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Islamic cosmopolitanism. Asia’s Muslim-majority cities in the first decades of the twenty-first 
century, Green suggests, are characterised by a steady ‘decosmopoliticisation’.   Against a backdrop 
of both population growth and rising levels of rural-urban migration, Green argues that Muslim-
majority cities in Asia are both seeing the emigration of ethno-religious minorities, and the 
emergence of increasingly segregated urban landscapes. As such forms of segregation have become 
further visible in Muslim Asia, the region’s ethno-religious minorities have increasingly moved to 
cities in the West.  
By exploring networks that are predominantly though not exclusively Muslim and which connect two 
cities at different extremes of Asia, this article seeks to build on these studies and underscore the 
conceptual benefits of treating lived modes of dealing with difference not in terms of constituting a 
search for unqualified openness but, rather, as fraught attempts to live together at the same time as 
maintaining distinctive social identities. In this sense, it corroborates the findings of earlier work in 
the anthropology of Muslim societies and points to the relevance of such studies for understanding 
contemporary forms of Muslim trade and commerce. Geertz (1978) and Barth (1983) brought 
attention to the cosmopolitan aspects of bazaars in the Middle East yet also recognised that in other 
contexts (especially the home) social boundaries were vigorously erected and maintained. The 
article seeks demonstrate how the modes of dealing with difference that are showcased on a daily 
basis by the long-distance traders on whom it focuses are informed by pragmatic commercial 
concerns and especially visible in their commercial dealings (cf. Alavi 2015; Sood 2016). 
Cosmopolitanism remains a valuable analytical device for interpreting such modes of dealing with 
difference however because my informants think in reflexive and public ways about what their 
ability to fashion relationships across boundaries of religion, ethnicity and language, often asking 
themselves as they do  what doing so signifies about themselves as well as the worlds they inhabit.  
The article is based on ethnographic fieldwork conducted over the course of five years with traders 
who identify themselves as being from Afghanistan and who regularly travel between Yiwu and 
Odessa in connection with the trade in small, Chinese-made commodities. Many different trading 
networks are active in Odessa’s Seventh-Kilometre market, ranging from Turks, Kurds and Arabs to 
Vietnamese, Chinese and Nigerians. Traders from Afghanistan are the focus of this article because 
this group specialises in the trade between Odessa and Yiwu.  The history of the interaction between 
Odessa-based Afghans and Yiwu goes back to the late 1990s: during this decade, several individuals 
decided to place the import of commodities from China to Ukraine as the central element of their 
commercial activities. Prior to this, these men had brought goods to Ukraine from Turkey, the United 
Arab Emirates, as well as Thailand and Taiwan. While some of these figures have experience of 
trading between Ukraine and Afghanistan (e.g. exporting cooking oil and wood to Afghanistan), the 
business activities of most of them now revolves around Chinese-made commodities.  
Elsewhere I have explored the ethnolinguistically diverse nature of these network (Marsden 2016b); 
my aim here is to bring attention to the commercial and social ties that exist between Muslim 
traders from Afghanistan and those who identify with the country’s substantial but today dispersed 
Hindu ethno-religious minority. My ethnography suggests that the ability to manage heterogeneous 
social relationships (e.g. between Hindu and Muslim traders from Afghanistan) and reflect on 
increasingly ‘hidden histories’ of inter-religious engagement is of critical significance to the activities 
and identities of these commodity traders. The ongoing ability of Afghan Muslim merchants in 
Odessa and Yiwu to nurture and sustain modes of trading and living together with members of the 
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country’s small yet commercially influential Hindu minority corroborates Green’s arguments about 
the ‘de-cosmopolitanization’ of cities in Muslim Asia. Indeed, in the context of circulations of people 
and things that are informed by historic forms of connectedness while also being made possible in 
the current era by modern forms of economic globalisation, the ethnography presented points to 
the social and historic processes through which Islamic cosmopolitanism is being relocated from 
cities with Muslim Asia to those outside.  
Odessa and Yiwu: Sites of Asia Asian Interaction 
Attempts by anthropologists to document and explore specifically Islamic expressions of 
cosmopolitanism have largely focused on historic cities in the Muslim world - ‘sites of interaction’ 
(Harper and Amrith 2012) in which Muslims from different backgrounds and cultural contexts have 
come into contact with one another for hundreds of years (e.g. Humphrey, Marsden and Skirvskaja 
2008; Can 2013). By contrast, Odessa and Yiwu have come to be known to Muslim merchants within 
and beyond Asia as sites in which commercial networks converge, and also as being home to 
sizeable and diverse Muslim communities, over a much shorter period of history.  
Odessa’s significance to Muslim Asians thus peaked historically in the first decades of the twentieth 
century: Eileen Kane (2014) has demonstrated the important role that the city played in the 
pilgrimage routes of Muslims from Russia, Russian and Chinese Turkestan, and Afghanistan, to the 
Hejaz in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Steam ships sailing from Odessa both 
shortened the duration of the journey to Mecca, and also made possible a stop en-route in the 
capital city of the Ottoman Empire (Istanbul), a city that a new generation of hajjis desired to visit to 
see during this period. In the context of these developments, Muslim entrepreneurs and religious 
specialists shifted to Odessa in order to cash in on these developments: they opened inns, 
restaurants, and eventually imperially supported complexes for the transiting hajjis.  
While Odessa was recognised as an important commercial centre by traders in Muslim settings in 
the early twentieth century, its significance as a site of contemporary commerce for Muslim trading 
networks arose against the backdrop of the Cold War. The city hosted students from Muslim 
countries in its universities, technical colleges, and military training academies from the 1950s 
onwards, some of whom went on to achieve positions of power and influence in their home 
countries. Aslam Watanjar (Afghanistan’s Defence Minister 1979), studied in Odessa during the 
decade prior to his appointment to high office in Afghanistan. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
individuals (mostly men) who had been living in Odessa since having arrived there as students in the 
1970s and 1980s began to trade in the city’s emerging marketplaces. From the mid-1990s onwards, 
Ukraine’s relatively porous borders enabled Muslim traders, migrants, sojourners, and exiles to 
move to the city with the specific aim of earning a living in the rapidly expanding Seventh-Kilometre 
market. Many had come to know of the city having been students in Odessa during the Soviet years; 
others had been alerted to its attention as a place to trade and to live well by relatives in their home 
countries. For still more, the city formed a useful ‘way station’ on overland migration to Europe 
(Skirvskaja 2012).  
Over the following decades, Odessa’s Muslim communities became an increasingly prominent and 
public aspect of the city’s dynamics. Wealthy merchants with powerful contacts both in Ukraine and 
in their home countries established mosques in Odessa, including a prominent Arab cultural centre-
cum-mosque in the city centre. At the same time, community leaders acting on behalf of particular 
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ethnic and national groups established smaller prayer rooms in the city’s suburbs. These were often 
associated with particular ethno-linguistic migrant groups (e.g. Afghans, Chechens, Daghestanis, and 
Azeris, as well as Kurds and Turks both from Turkey and the former Soviet Union).3 Anthropologists 
have explored the relationships between Odessa’s multiple Turkic communities in Odessa, and the 
diverse ways in which such people reflect about their status in the city through the lens of Ottoman 
history (Skrvskaja 2014). Muslim-trader-migrants to Odessa from a diverse range of ethno-linguistic 
backgrounds establish relations with one another, and across a variety of domains, including those 
of trade, religious ritual, charity, education, and family life. Islam therefore plays a public role in the 
city and its immediate environs; this has resulted in Odessa occupying an increasingly visible position 
in the geographic horizons of Muslims in West and Central Asia but simultaneously resulted in 
hostility by local Odessans towards Islam and Muslims (e.g. Skrvskaja 2014).  
Yiwu’s relationship to Asia’s Muslim societies by contrast is firmly rooted in the globalising political 
economy that followed in the wake of China’s decision to accept World Trade Organisation rules in 
1997.  Against the backdrop of China’s policies of economic liberalisation, which grew in intensity 
during the 1980s, the city rose to prominence in the early 1990s as a centre for trade between China 
and South, Central, and West Asia. From the early 2000s onwards, Yiwu gained a degree of public 
notoriety in China as well as the wider world as a result of the distinctively ‘Islamic’ flavour of life in 
parts of the city in which foreign traders lived and socialised.4  
If Yiwu attracts visitors from most parts of the world and is now also a home to or at least stable 
node in the geographically dispersed activities of culturally and religious diverse trading 
communities,5 the city has earned a reputation amongst international networks of Muslim traders as 
being a Chinese city in which everyday life for observant overseas Muslims is straightforward, 
especially in comparison to elsewhere in the country.6 During my stay in Yiwu I watched as Islamic 
scholars from the Rakhine region of Myanmar travelled from restaurant-to-restaurant gathering 
donations for members of the community. I also encountered a preacher from Indian Kashmir 
gathering donations for Islamic movements based in India. The main occasion on which foreign 
Muslim merchants based in Yiwu did regularly remark to me that their lives were being affected by 
stringent policy by Chinese authorities towards Islam was during the run up to the G20 2016 summit 
that was held in Hangzhou (85 miles from Yiwu). During this period, Yiwu’s authorities carefully 
monitored the residency of foreign traders in the city, and restricted the widespread use of unofficial 
mosques for holding prayers.   
Specific parts of Yiwu’s urban landscape are especially informed by Islamic symbols. While in Yiwu 
foreign Muslim traders face few difficulties in maintaining Islamic requirements and practices during 
the course of everyday life. There are several mosques in the city; these are not officially registered, 
but are open for daily prayers (mostly presided over by Imams who belong to China’s ethnically Hui 
                                                          
3 On Islamic associations in Ukraine see Yarosh, O. and D. Brylov 2011.  
4 An extensive body of literature exists in Chinese on Yiwu, e.g. Ma, Yan [马艳]. 2012. Yige xinyang qunti de 
yimin shijian - Yiwu Musilin shehui shenghuo de minzu zhi (The Migrated Practice of a Faith Community: An 
Ethnography of Yiwu Muslims Social Life). Beijing: Central Minzu U. Publishers. 
5 According to official statistics, 14,000 foreigners are registered as living in Yiwu.  
6 By contrast, for migrants from Xinjiang the city is widely regarded as being a context in which it is difficult to 
settle for work or business due to government policies that discourage migration from Xinjiang. 
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Muslim community).7 The city’s central mosque (located a 10-minute walk from the city centre) is 
also a site at which Muslims gather on Friday afternoons for congregational prayer, as well as for 
post and pre-prayer socialising over dishes of Chinese Muslim food. During the month of Ramadan, 
the extended post-fast taraweh prayers as well as collective gatherings at which the fast is broken 
(iftar) are regularly organised in the city’s many halal restaurants by traders. Indeed, during 
Ramadan, Muslim traders in Yiwu often collect donations that cover the travel and living expenses of 
a hafiz (a term that refers to Islamic authorities who have committed the entire Qur’an to memory) 
who visit Yiwu in order to recite verses of the holy book. In 2016, for example, worshippers at a 
mosque in Yiwu that is predominantly attended by traders from Afghanistan (though some ethnically 
Kurdish traders from Iran also worshipped there) arranged for two hafiz-e qura’n to travel to Yiwu 
from Mumbai. In addition to reciting the Qur’an in the mosque over the course of Ramadan, one of 
two hafiz visiting Yiwu recited the evening azan (which marks the opening of the days’ fast) in a 
restaurant that is jointly owned by two Afghan traders (one of the partners had moved to Yiwu from 
a commercial town in southern Russia having traded between Russia and China for several years). 
On inquiring as to why the traders had not funded an Afghan hafiz to visit the city, a trader from 
north-eastern Afghanistan told me that bringing scholars to Yiwu from India worked out being more 
economic (iqtisodi); furthermore, a visiting Afghan hafiz required a higher level of maintenance as a 
guest (mehmon) during their stay in the city than that required of individuals who identified with a 
different ethno-national communities. The circulation of religious personnel in connection with 
major events in the Muslim calendar such as Ramadan points to the openness of Muslims in the city 
to engagement with people from different cultural backgrounds than their own, even if such 
engagement arises from the pressures of the ‘religious market’ (Green 2015) as much as from a 
distinctively religious inclination to forged ties with the ‘global’ Islamic umma (brotherhood).8  
Another way in which the Islamic character of Yiwu is publicly visible is in terms of the city’s 
‘foodways’. There are many restaurants along the city’s central axis - Chouzhou Lu - that cater 
specifically to a Muslim clientele: restaurants run and owned by Hui and Uyghur Muslims who have 
migrated to Yiwu from elsewhere in China (especially Xinjiang, Ningxia, and Lanzhou), compete with 
eateries that have been established by international traders based in the city. For international 
traders, owning a restaurant is not only a mode of making money, but also a strategy for expanding 
their business activities, and of establishing commercial networks with traders working in the 
regions of the world to which they export commodities. Several such restaurants are owned by 
individuals who belong to communities that have played a role in serving food to mobile Muslim 
traders in cosmopolitan trading nodes elsewhere in Asia such as Dubai, Jeddah, and Istanbul.  There 
are thus several Afghan restaurants in Yiwu. On the whole, these are clearly demarcated as eateries 
associated with Afghanistan – flags of Afghanistan adorn their walls, as too do pictures of iconic sites 
in the country (such as the Buddhas in Bamiyan and the shrine of Ali in Mazar-i Sharif). Indeed, the 
names of the restaurants reflect the competing nature of Afghanistan’s official national identity 
formations, formations indeed that sought to harness the cosmopolitan history of the territory in 
which Afghanistan is located for nationalist aims. One prominent restaurant is called ‘Ariana’ - a 
name that indexes the country’s pre-Islamic and European past as being the plank on which 
Afghanistan’s political elites sought to stake a ‘civilizational claims on the international stage in the 
                                                          
7 On the ethno-national category ‘Hui’, see Gladney 1995; for a study of Hui Muslims, see Erie 2015.  
8 Several of my informants reported to me that the Islamic preacher-celebratory Dr Zakir Naik visited the city in 
2014. Cf. Al Sudairi 2016.  
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decades after independence in 1919’ (cf. Nile Green 2016: 1). Another restaurant owned by traders 
from Afghanistan in Yiwu, by contrast, carries the name Kabul Darbar, thereby geographically and 
politically locating Afghanistan within Islamic(ate) Eurasia (darbar being an Indo-Persian term used 
to refer to the courtly). Indeed, the names of such restaurants carry significance for traders from 
Afghanistan visiting and living in the city: the regular Afghan clientele at Kabul Darbar mostly 
comprises traders who identify themselves as speaking Pashto and hailing from regions that lie 
adjacent to Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan; the men who gather nightly to smoke shisha and 
take green tea at Ariana are generally Persian speakers from central and northern Afghanistan, many 
of whom identify with imaginaries that insert Persianate culture and civility at the heart of 
Afghanistan’s national identity.9    
Importantly, however, the menus and clientele of these restaurants suggest that the public 
presentations of these establishments as being committed to purified national communities reveals 
only an element of the identities of those who both own and visit them. The restaurants also sell 
dishes popularised by Afghan cooks and restauranteurs, for example, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia’s port 
city. ‘Bukhary’ restaurants - eateries named after the nineteenth century Central Asian Emirate 
which cook Central Asian dishes that have been adapted to Arab tastes over decades – are a feature 
of the urban landscape across Saudi Arabia that are predominantly run by Uzbek-speaking men from 
northern Afghanistan’s Sar-i Pul province, but visited by West Africans, Saudi Arabians, and Yemenis 
rather more than there are Afghans or Central Asians (who frequent restaurants known to serve 
‘authentic’ dishes). The clientele at such eateries in Yiwu – including at an establishment called 
‘Amanullah’ that closed in 2017 - are both visiting traders from Afghanistan but also merchants from 
elsewhere (such as Nigeria, Yemen and Chad) who are familiar with these types of cooking having 
tasted it in the nodes that were important to their trading activities before they moved to Yiwu. 
Restaurants that appear to carry distinctively national identities, therefore bear the clear imprint of 
decades of circulation, as well as long-term settlement in the choke points that are important to 
such patterns of mobility and exchange.  
The past thirty years, then, has seen the growing significance of Odessa and Yiwu within Muslim 
imaginaries of trade and travel. Both cities have come to be recognised as sites in which commercial 
personnel and merchant networks that are identifiably Muslim may thrive economically at the same 
time as the men and women who form them continue to publicly adhere to Islam. Additionally, 
while Muslim commercial networks present in both cities are defined in terms of a variety of 
combinations of defined ethno-linguistic and national identities, there are also important ‘sites of 
interactions’ within each of context at which Muslims from different regions and backgrounds 
interact. In both Odessa and Yiwu, furthermore, Muslims have been required to face and respond to 
forms of hostility that have arisen in the context of their being Muslim. In spite of these forces, 
however, for many of the traders, life in both Odessa and Yiwu is compared positively to other 
centres of commercial life with which they are familiar. Afghan traders, for example, regularly 
contrast the ease with which they lead convivial and public lives in Yiwu and Odessa with the 
restrictions that a combination of state officials and public attitudes towards Muslims place on this 
                                                          
9 On the naming of businesses in other trading communities see Anderson 2011 and Heslop 2015.  
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aspect of everyday life elsewhere, notably in Moscow and St Petersburg, cities that are central for 
their transregional commercial strategies yet known as being ‘difficult for life’.10  
While one aspect of both Yiwu and Odessa that attracts Muslim traders is the forms of Islamic 
infrastructures present in them, it is important not to exaggerate this out of context. While being 
able to lead a properly Muslim religious life is a critical aspect of Afghan traders’ notion of the good 
life, many of the traders also claim that the forms of Islam practiced in Yiwu and Odessa are flexible, 
not only in comparison to those influential in Afghanistan but also in Western Europe. As one of my 
informants in Odessa remarked to me, ‘I can’t stand it when my Afghan relatives visit me in Ukraine 
from London. Immediately, they ask what is halal and what is not. I say to them, we are not 
bothered by that issue here, so long as it is not pork. If you are, then you had better get ready to eat 
fish for the remainder of your stay’. What the traders value about Yiwu and Odessa is that Islamic 
infrastructures and symbols are deeply embedded but not in a manner that precludes the possibility 
for interacting with these urban environments in relationship to different sets of values, aspirations, 
and moral orders (cf. Schielke 2009).  
Hindu and Muslim Afghan Commercial Co-operations 
While the majority of traders from Afghanistan who trade in Yiwu commodities in Odessa are 
Muslim, it is impossible to understand the historical emergence of their activities in both cities 
without taking into account the role played by people who identify with Afghanistan’s Hindu and 
Sikh ethno-religious minorities. During the course of my fieldwork in Yiwu I noticed that there were 
regular gatherings of Hindus and Sikhs from Afghanistan in one of the city’s most lively streets 
known for its outdoor restaurants and ‘Middle Eastern’ ambience. The men who gathered at these 
events – regularly involving up to 25 persons - spoke mostly in Pashtu and Dari, only occasionally 
breaking into Punjabi or English. They were either based permanently in Yiwu or visiting the city on 
purchasing trips from a wide range of global cities, most especially Moscow, Odessa, New Delhi, the 
UAE, and London. During the course of a series of conversations with these men, they told me how 
their families were often based in New Delhi, while they worked and traded between Russia, Ukraine 
and China. During fieldwork in 2016, members of the community also informed me that the 
weakening Russian currency was making their activities as importers and suppliers of goods on credit 
in Russia increasingly difficult and that in this context some had chosen to move to London where 
there are established communities of Afghan Hindus and Sikhs, mostly dating to the early 1990s and 
the outbreak of civil war in the country.   
Dheepak for example is a trader based in Odessa who is in his early forties and belongs to a family 
that identifies itself as being Afghan Hindus.11 Dheepak’s father lived in Afghanistan until the 
collapse of the pro-Soviet government of President Najibullah Ahmadzai in 1992, while Dheepak 
himself had left Afghanistan in the early eighties, and moved to New Delhi, the city in which he had 
been raised and schooled. The family are Punjabi-speaking Hindus who had been based in North 
West India until 1947, at which point, in the context of the partition of India and the creation of 
                                                          
10 The leading of a ‘life-well-lived’ is an important aspects of Afghan trading ethics, see Marsden 2016b. 
11 Approximately 15 Sikh and Hindu Afghan families are based in Odessa. The community have established a 
temple that is used as a place of worship for both Sikhs and Hindus. The temple was established in cooperation 
with the local branch of the Hari Krishna movement and is located in a village close to the Seventh-Kilometre 
market.  
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Pakistan, Dheepak’s grandfather moved to Afghanistan, settling in the environs of the eastern city of 
Jalalabad. The family had been active in various types of commercial activity in Afghanistan, 
including the official barter trade in dried fruits and wood that took place between Kabul and the 
Soviet Union – it was in connection to this trade that one of Dheepak’s father’s brothers had visited 
Ukraine in the late 1970s. By the beginning of the 1980s, in addition to working in Soviet-related 
traders, the family had become the sole sale agent in Afghanistan for Toshiba electronic products. 
The products were imported to Afghanistan from Japan by a Kabul-based Sikh; Dheepak’s father’s 
trading agency was responsible for the wholesale of the goods in Afghanistan, allowing him to make 
a name for himself and his family members as trustworthy operators in Kabul’s central wholesale 
market, the mandawi. During the 1980s other family members started to travel to and from Kabul 
and cities in East Asia, most especially Hong Kong, a city in which traders from Afghanistan currently 
based there told me that was home to approximately forty Afghan trading companies in the 1980s. 
During the 1980s, Dheepak’s family members purchased digital watches that I have been told were 
especially popular with the Soviet Union’s Red Army Afghanistan-stationed soldiers. There appears 
to have been a barter-style trade between these Hong Kong-made modern watches and the high-
quality Soviet-made time pieces that army personnel bought with them from the USSR. Like many 
other Hindu families, Deephak lived in a street in Kabul’s Kart-e Parwan neighbourhood, in the 
environs of which both Hindu temples (mandir) and Sikh gurdwaras were constructed by merchant 
families identifying with these ethno-religious minority communities. The family had done well 
enough in its various trading activities to own their own property in this part of the city by the mid-
1980s.  
According to officials with whom I have spoken in the pro-Soviet government of Dr Najibullah 
Ahmadzai (d. 1995), the administration made efforts to keep Hindus and Sikhs in Afghanistan, not 
least because their skills in the arts of trade and money exchange were central to the country’s 
economy. However, after the collapse of Dr Najibullah’s government (1992) and in the wake of the 
rise to power of mujahidin groups, many of the country’s Sikh and Hindu traders left the country, 
moving to India, either flying on commercial airlines or using clandestine routes that passed through 
Pakistan. After the rise to power of the mujahidin forces in Kabul, many of the houses owned by 
Sikhs and Hindus in the Kart-e Parwan neighbourhood were occupied by influential figures 
associated with the mujahidin; after returning to Kabul in the context of the defeat of the Taliban by 
the US and a range of mujahidin groups, these mujahidin-aligned strongmen were purportedly 
involved in the illegal sale of the same properties for inflated $US prices. The years of the Taliban’s 
control of Kabul saw restrictions placed on Afghanistan’s Hindu and Sikh communities, Hindus being 
instructed, for example, to wear insignia that identified them as non-Muslim dhimmis (minorities).   
Dheepak’s family were permanently based in India for over a decade after leaving Kabul, yet, as was 
the case for many other Hindu and Sikhs who had moved to the country from Afghanistan, they 
found conditions of both life and business in India difficult. On the one hand, access to official 
permits and citizenship was difficult if not impossible for these historic Indian diasporic communities 
that had long ties to Afghanistan and India’s North West Frontier.12 On the other hand, business 
conditions in India were not favourable to the type of trading activities in which such families were 
specialised: there were high levels of competition in India’s markets, and major Indian traders were 
                                                          
12 On Afghanistan’s Sikh and Hindu trading communities and networks, see Dale 2002; Hanifi 2008; Markovits 
2000.  
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able to run businesses on miniscule profit margins. In the face of these difficulties, Dheepak and his 
father moved from Delhi to Tashkent having heard from Afghan traders based in Central Asia of the 
types of business opportunities that Uzbekistan offered in the years following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. In Tashkent, Dheepak and his father (the family’s women stayed on in Delhi where 
they were supported by Dheepak’s elder brother who was training to be a doctor) functioned as 
‘shuttle traders’: they brought ‘all types of goods’ from Dubai to Tashkent on a regular flight. Whilst 
Dheepak remembers working conditions as having been ‘difficult’, largely as a result of the hostility 
to the presence of foreign traders in the city of the local police force and security agents, the 
business was successful: father and son were able to make a decent living for themselves, while also 
sending funds back to India for their families. 
Having worked for three years in Tashkent, Dheepak moved to Moscow, another city that is well 
known historically to Hindu and Sikh traders from Afghanistan. Until the end of the nineteenth 
century, Sikh and Hindu communities from Afghanistan had stationed themselves in Moscow in 
order to arrange the money transfers that made trade between Kabul and Russia possible (Hanifi 
2011). While the scope for such activities was dramatically narrowed during the high years of the 
Soviet Union, traders such as Dheepak’s uncle did keep these links alive from the 1960s onwards, 
mostly through their involvement in official barter trade. During his time in Moscow Dheepak was 
involved in the trade of Chinese goods to Russia. In the early 1990s Sikh and Hindu traders from 
Afghanistan were amongst some of the first traders to import goods to Russia from Asia (initially 
from Hong Kong where they had established contacts, and in later years Taiwan, Thailand, and 
eventually China). The networks involved in this type of trade, however, were not exclusively 
‘Hindu’: men such as Dheepak’s father distributed commodities as loans (qarz) to Muslim traders 
from Afghanistan who had moved to Russia and Ukraine after the collapse of the pro-Soviet regime 
in which they had served and the subsequent outbreak of a civil war involving the countries’ 
mujahidin factions (Marsden 2015).  
Dheepak’s stay in Moscow, however, was shorter than expected: he was attacked on his way 
between the market and his rented apartment and lost a large sum of money as a result. After this, 
Dheepak moved to Kiev in Ukraine where his uncle (who as we have already seen had been 
travelling to Ukraine since the 1970s in connection with the official Afghanistan-USSR barter trade) 
ran a well-established business in the Troeshina wholesale market in Kiev.  Dheepak told me that he 
initially worked for his uncle for a paltry salary of $50 a month simply because he wanted to learn 
the business, and find out how to be a successful trader in Ukraine. He went on to tell me, however, 
that he soon left his uncle’s business because he realised that it would be impossible to learn how to 
trade from a relative: those close to you can never deliver the discipline that a successful master-
apprentice relationship requires. For some years, then, Dheepak sold goods on a percentage basis in 
Kiev, taking the goods from importers based in the bazaar, and selling them in the city’s markets.  
After a while, Dheepak was able to bring his father to Ukraine from Tashkent, helping him to adjust 
to the city’s business practices over the coming years. In the late 1990s Dheepak and his father 
entered into a business partnership with a leading Odessa-based Afghan Muslim trader. The trader, 
Riaz, at the time aged in his early forties, had studied in one of Odessa’s military academies, and only 
returned to the city in 1992. The Muslim and Hindu traders pooled capital and travelled to Dubai and 
Taiwan in order to bring goods for sale in Odessa. Additionally, these traders also formed a ‘group’ 
(gruh) that brought commodities to Ukraine for other traders of Afghan background working in 
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Ukraine, charging their clients a percentage of the total costs of the products they brought for them. 
During this phase of their trading activities, the partnership had to contend with competition from 
traders newly arriving from Afghanistan who were seeking to take control of a large share of the 
now very profitable market using finances brought from Kabul. Dheephak recounted to me how 
during these years some Afghan Muslim traders had sought to force him and his father out of the 
market. He claimed that it was only the support of the Muslim traders with whom they had 
developed established business partnerships that had allowed them to withstand the pressure and 
to continue to trade in the city. By the early 2000s, Dheephak and his father had switched their 
activities from shuttle trading between Dubai and Taiwan to Yiwu. Rather than selling ‘all types of 
things’, father and son had now also moved into a specialist trading operation – the working glove – 
which they purchased in Yiwu’s Futian market as well as directly from factories elsewhere in China. 
The business has been a high-volume activity for several years, although, he told me in 2016, the 
financial crisis of 2008 and then the conflict between Russia and Ukraine in 2014 had resulted in the 
market ‘slowing’ and ultimately reducing the size of their overall trading activities. Whereas Dheepak 
had travelled to Yiwu in China approximately once a month in the mid-2000s, by the time I spoke to 
him in the summer of August 2016, he only made the trip on three or so occasions each year.  
Indeed, the state of the market in Odessa, and the fact that his children were now finishing their 
schooling and soon to start at university had led Dheepak to think seriously about his future in 
Ukraine.  On the one hand, Dheepak told me, his daughter would be expected to marry someone 
from within the community of Afghan Hindus, and there were very few such marriageable men in 
Odessa. On the other hand, the bazaar had been ‘asleep’ (khow) for many months, he was now 
eating into his family savings in order to keep the businesses going, and did not know how long this 
situation would last. Yet Deephak was also very reluctant to move elsewhere – ‘how many times can 
I go somewhere, find a new house for my family, build up a new business, learn the new culture – it 
is very tiring and I am tired of it’, he told me one day as we sat in his shop in the market. Despite 
these reservations of moving on once more, Dheepak was considering making a visit to London: 
being in possession of a UK business visa that he had yet to use, he told me that he needed to travel 
to the UK anyway should he wish to make a successful visa application for the country in the future. 
There was also a new scheme for issuing business visas to people who invested in the country, he 
told me, and so during his stay in the UK he would also explore the possibility of using that scheme 
to relocate his family to the UK. This was a strategy that other Afghan Hindu and Sikhs had 
purportedly used to gradually shift their business activities from Odessa to London.13  
Deephak’s life history demonstrates the centrality of cooperation involving Hindu, Sikhs and Muslims 
from Afghanistan to the commercial networks that connect Yiwu and Odessa to one another today. 
Such cooperation has proved vital to commercial portfolios established in the context of exile and 
international migration. Traders such as Dheepak and his father and uncles supported the activities 
of Muslim Afghans by providing commodities and credit; they also entered joint partnerships that 
allowed all traders to access commercial suppliers in Asia with the relatively low levels of capital in 
which they were in possession. Finally, while there had clearly been tensions between Afghan 
Muslims and Hindus/Sikhs, these had been mitigated by traders offering support of both a political, 
                                                          
13 Sikh and Hindu traders of Afghan background tend to run their business in Southall, a historically important 
neighbourhood for South Asian communities.  
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economic, and social nature to one another, and recognising in a competitive economic 
environment, the mutually beneficial nature of the commercial ties that had brought them together.   
Islamic Cosmopolitanism? 
Having explored the forms of cooperation that saw Hindu and Muslim traders from Afghanistan 
working alongside one another in Odessa’s Seventh-Kilometre market, I now address the role played 
by such multi-dimensional networks in connecting Yiwu and Odessa. Doing so reveals how far the 
forms of trust and reputation accounting upon which such networks are founded arise not merely 
from either pre-existing forms of trust based on kinship or ethnicity or from cooperation in the 
context of exile and migration: rather, what is also evident in Odessa is the reproduction of 
commercial relations over generations.  
Having been born in Afghanistan, brought up in India, and intermittently lived in Uzbekistan, Russia, 
and China, Dheepak now sat at the desk in his spacious shop in Odessa’s Seventh-Kilometre market. 
He counted his earnings for the day, and gave instructions to a Muslim labourer from Guinea whom 
he employed in his shop about which boxes of the type of Chinese-made working gloves in which he 
dealt to move from the display area in front to the storage area at the back. Another employee, a 
Muslim man in his thirties from Jhelum in Pakistan’s Punjab province, also shifted boxes of gloves 
around the interior of the shop. Meanwhile news from India was beaming out of a television set 
positioned directly opposite from the desk at which we were sitting.  
Dheepak was not alone in his shop that day, though his father, who now ran a small business across 
the Kharkovsky Square (so named because it is the part of the market in which the buses that freight 
goods from Odessa to Kharkiv park) of the Seventh-Kilometre, had not joined his son for their usual 
cup of mid-morning chilled green tea delivered to the shop by a mobile café run by a Ukrainian from 
Odessa. Father and son were at loggerheads over the former’s wish to make a substantial payment 
to his elder son, a fully trained doctor based in New Delhi with his family. Dheepak had argued that it 
was he who had worked hard to develop the family’s business activities and that as his brother 
already owned a home and enjoyed a stable salary, there was little need for him to take a slice of the 
profits of a company that he had contributed little directly towards. The conflict had grown to such a 
level of intensity that father and son no longer lived under the same roof, the father having moved 
with Dheepak’s mother to a small flat, whereas Dheepak lived with his family in a large and highly 
valuable detached house with garden.  
A further man present in the room was Nasir, a Farsi-speaking trader in his early forties whose family 
is originally from a mountainous region in north eastern Afghanistan; the family, however, have 
been based in Kabul since the early 1980s. Nasir currently lives in Yiwu where he runs a trading 
company that assists traders visiting the city in the sourcing, purchase, storage, customs clearance, 
and transportation of commodities. Nasir moved to China from Afghanistan in 1998 having been 
awarded a Chinese-funded scholarship by Afghan officials connected to the mujahidin government 
led by Burhanudin Rabbani (d. 2011). Nasir studied International Relations at a respected Chinese-
language university in eastern central China, and went on to successfully study for an MA in the 
same institution. It was only in 2006 that Nasir turned his Chinese-language skills (fluency in both 
written and spoken Chinese) to use in the field of trade, opening a trading office in Yiwu. He told me 
that during his student years he had known of their being Afghan traders in Yiwu, but had focused 
on his studies and so had never had the time to visit the city.  
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Initially, Nasir’s was actively involved in the lively trade of small commodities between Yiwu and 
Afghanistan: he facilitated (for a commission rate) the shipments of traders who were based in two 
of Kabul’s main wholesale markets (the Mandawi and Bush markets). This type of business mainly 
revolved around the type of commodities that are popular amongst the many private security 
companies that were established in Afghanistan in the years of NATO occupation – heavy duty 
boots, reporter-style waistcoats, and equipment such as torches, for example. Traders from Nasir’s 
home region in eastern Afghanistan were especially active in this trading niche. This was partly 
because of their connections to former mujahidin commanders who had now moved into the private 
security business or successfully sought employment in the Ministry of Defence. Another reason that 
people from Nasir’s region themselves give for being successful in these activities is that their 
villages are located close to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border; as a result, their region had been sited 
on historic trade routes, and its people thereby regarded nationally as being expert traders.   
Due to the gradual withdrawal of NATO forces after 2014, and restrictions on the activities of private 
security companies in the country, however there was a substantial decline in this type of trade 
between China and Afghanistan. In the context of these changes, Nasir had sought to create new 
geographical niches in his portfolio of trading activities. Nasir assisted, for example, a Pashto-
speaking trader based in London with the shipping of bags and suitcases between Yiwu and London. 
But it was in Ukraine where Nasir had developed his business activities most successfully, especially 
in the eastern city of Kharkiv where several traders from his region of eastern Afghanistan were 
based. The traders in Kharkiv used Nasir and his fluent Chinese to buy and arrange for the 
transportation of goods from Yiwu to Ukraine. Nasir was employed on a commission basis by these 
merchants when they visited Yiwu on their annual trips to source and procure commodities to sell in 
Kharkiv. He also used new technologies, especially the Chinese App, wechat, in his trading activities: 
traders in Kharkiv send photos of the goods they require, and Nasir informs them about the costs of 
purchase, storage and transport of these before deciding whether to arrange a deal. Additionally, 
due to his relation with Chinese suppliers in the Futian market, as well as with the factories that 
supply these, Nasir is able to arrange for the Kharkiv-based traders’ shipments to be delivered on 
credit basis, usually meaning that they are expected to make a partial payment on the purchase of 
the commodities, and to pay the remaining amount three months after their despatch from China.  
Nasir had travelled to Ukraine in the summer of 2016, along with his wife and their three-year-old 
son, in order to meet with his business clients in the cities of Kharkiv and Odessa. Such visits form an 
important element of the business activities of such China-based traders, and are an important way 
in which their trading networks are sustained and expanded. Six months after visiting Odessa, for 
example, Nasir also made a trip, with a friend and business partner from Afghanistan (also based in 
Yiwu) to Moscow. These trips are used to both explore new markets and make relevant business 
contacts, but also to follow up on the collection of overdue debts from the previous season’s 
trading. The traders effortlessly switch between the blocs of flats in which they live in Yiwu with the 
homes of their friends and business associates in Odessa, Moscow, and Kharkiv. Nasir had told me 
that he was interested in seeking out clients in Odessa, and it was partly with this aim in mind that 
he had visited the city. During his visit to the city, he also took me to see a Pashto-speaking man 
from south eastern Afghanistan who sold cosmetics in Odessa, and with whom one of his associates 
in Yiwu was involved in a conflict over the costs of shipping goods between Yiwu and Odessa. 
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In addition to catching up with business partners, smoothing over conflicts that had arisen in the 
preceding months, and recovering unpaid debts, Nasir had also visited Ukraine to arrange for the 
circumcision of his young son, an operation that had been performed by an Azeri doctor based in the 
city of Kharkiv. According to Nasir, the operation, which he believed was crucial for all Muslim boys 
to undergo, was rarely carried out in China, and, when it was, Chinese surgeons performed the 
procedure in such a manner that the child’s penis did not heal for several months. The young boy 
and his mother were sitting with us in the shop that day.   
Nasir and Dheepak conversed with one another in Farsi, though Dheepak told me he had not learned 
the language in Afghanistan or from his father who spoke both it and Pashto fluently, but over the 
course of the many years that he had worked alongside traders from Afghanistan in Tashkent, Kiev, 
and Odessa. I had come to know about Nasir and Deepak’s relationship in Yiwu when Nasir had 
remarked that other traders from the same region of eastern Afghanistan as him had been shocked 
to discover that he preferred to be hosted by a Hindu Afghan than ‘one of his own’. Indeed, 
confirming the important role that the provision of hospitality plays in the enactment of and claims 
to be cosmopolitan (Werbner 2016), Nasir chose on his trip to Odessa to accept the hospitality 
(mehmon dusti) of his Hindu friend and partner, rather than the offers of men from his ancestral 
region of Afghanistan. After the shop closed for the day at 12 noon, Dheepak, Nasir, and myself were 
invited by a group of three traders from Nasir’s home region for a dinner in an Afghan restaurant in 
Odessa that was owned by a further trader from Nasir’s home region. Having eaten, we returned 
home to Dheepak’s house: Nasir’s wife and young child had been there all along with with 
Dheepak’s wife and children, chatting and sipping tea from a pot that the Hindu family had brought 
with them from Kabul on leaving the city in the early 1990s. 
Nasir and Dheepak’s relationship however arose from more stable foundations than merely the odd 
encounter in Yiwu or Ukraine. Nasir’s closest friend and associate in Yiwu is Atiq, a man in his mid-
thirties who is from an established Kabul-based trading family, and whose ancestral home is in a 
small town in the east of the country close to Nasir’s home region. While young, Atiq has already 
performed the haj pilgrimage on several occasions and lives with his Afghan family in Yiwu – both 
public markers of his personal success as a trader, and reputation as someone who is honest and 
trustworthy. Atiq’s trading skills, however, have a long pedigree: his father is widely talked about by 
traders in Yiwu and beyond as having been one of Kabul’s first principal merchants to bring 
commodities from China to Afghanistan, notably the bicycle-e chinooie (Chinese bicycle) that was 
popular with city children in the country during the 1990s, and imported from Hong Kong. Dheepak 
told me how his father and Atiq’s father had worked together closely in Kabul bazaar in the 1970s 
and 1980s – Atiq’s father would give goods on credit to Deephak’s family that he had brought from 
Hong Kong, and Dheepak’s father would sell these in the bazaar to merchants from across the 
country.  On the basis of Atiq’s reference, I was told, Nasir and Dheepak had commenced working 
with one another.    
Several dynamics were thus visible in a shop in Odessa in which Chinese-made working gloves were 
sold at wholesale prices. Most obviously, the shop was a meeting place for traders and workers from 
countries across ‘the global South’, ranging from Guinea in Africa, to Pakistan, China, Afghanistan, 
and India in Asia. A relation that was central to this site of interaction in long-distance trading 
networks in Ukraine today, however, was between a Hindu and a Muslim, both of Afghan 
nationality. While Dheepeak’s family had left Afghanistan in the context of the rise to power of the 
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mujahidin, Nasir had benefitted from the same grouping assisting him to secure a scholarship to 
study in China. Such relations are not however only fashioned in the context of modern forms of 
‘globalisation’; they stretch back, rather, over several generations, and are intricately connected to 
an inter-generational circulation of credit, commodities, and reputations, as evidenced by the ties 
between Dheepak, Atiq and Atiq’s father.  
Conclusion 
Yiwu and Odessa both occupy an important position in the commercial and geographical horizons of 
Asia’s Muslims. This paper has sought to document the particular role played by Muslim trading 
networks in the interaction between these two cities that lie beyond the conventional boundaries of 
Muslim Asia. It has highlighted the role played by the Cold War in re-energising Odessa’s role as a 
site of Muslim commerce and sociability, and of economic reform in China as a trigger for the 
emergence of Yiwu as a new type of Muslim-oriented trading node. The paper has suggested that 
while Yiwu and Odessa might be both relatively new sites of Muslim commerce, the commercial 
activities of the mobile traders who work within them have relied on historically durable social types 
of social relations and institutions in building their trans-regional business profiles.  Focusing on the 
social relationships that are significant to the activities of the traders who work and live across 
Odessa and Yiwu simultaneously illuminates an aspect of contemporary Muslim commercial 
networks that is barely touched upon in existing accounts. Rather than pointing to the significance of 
reformist Islam or adherence to Sufi brotherhoods as factors explaining the durability of such 
networks, my ethnography suggests the significance of cosmopolitanism and flexibility to the modes 
of being Muslim enacted by Afghan participants in the Yiwu-Odessa trade. My aim has not, however, 
been to present a celebratory rendering of this mode of cosmopolitanism. Rather, the forms of 
cosmopolitanism evinced by men such as Dheepak and Nasir arises from the pragmatic concerns of 
hard-nosed traders whose lives are caught at the cusps of multiple forms of co-dependencies (cf. 
Alavi 2015).  Men such as these are seeking to make profit together while continuing to demonstrate 
their loyalty and adherence to their regional and ethno-religious communities. They are setting to 
this task in the context of a contentious contemporary geopolitical environment and a past scarred 
by violent conflict and hardened identities. Interactions between individuals affiliated to Islamist 
movements who chose to be the guests of Hindu Afghans rather than fellow Muslims, brings into 
sharp relief the need to understand the ways in which historic expressions of Islamic 
cosmopolitanism are finding new contexts in which to take hold.  
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